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Abstract
Measurement in ﬁnancial accounting often requires determining an interest rate to dis-
count future cash ﬂows. One example is the International Accounting Standard (IAS) 36
Impairment of assets. IAS 36’s impairment test requires determining a value in use (a
present value). The Appendix A to the standard gives some guidance on how to determine
a suitable discount rate. In this paper, we show that the diﬀerent approaches included
in IAS 36’s guidance are theoretically diﬀerent. We discuss how the standard should be
interpreted and applied based on the theoretical background of ﬁnancial theory. Only the
ﬁrst alternative, the weighted cost of capital should be used and the other two alternatives
should be discarded. In addition, we show that IAS 36’s guidance, applied in practice,
may give rise to substantial measurement errors.
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References 111 Introduction
Present values are frequently used in ﬁnancial reporting under International Financial
Reporting Standards (IFRS). For example, IAS 36’s impairment test requires the reporting
entity to determine a value in use. The value in use is deﬁned as ,,the present value of
the future cash ﬂows expected to be derived from an asset or cash-generating unit“.1
According to IAS 36.55, the discount rate should reﬂect the time value of money and the
risks speciﬁc to the asset, as far as the future cash ﬂow estimates have not been adjusted
for these risks. One major diﬀerence between IAS 36’s present value (value in use) and
the present values used in the common discounted cash ﬂow (DCF)-models lies in the
requirement to use pre-tax amounts for both the future cash ﬂows to be discounted and
the discount rate.2
IAS 36’s appendix gives comprehensive guidance on how to determine the appropriate
discount rate (commonly called ,,cost of capital“ in ﬁnance theory). In general, the cost
of capital may be estimated by comparison to market prices of similar assets and adjusted
if appropriate to reﬂect the speciﬁc risk associated with the assets.3 Appendix A.17 (to
IAS 36.57) goes on stating: ,,As a starting point in making such an estimate, the entity
might take into account the following rates:
• the entity’s weighted average cost of capital determined using techniques such as
the Capital Asset Pricing Model;
• the entity’s incremental borrowing rate;
• and other market borrowing rates.“
The wording implies a choice at the discretion of the reporting entity. This gives the
impression that either the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) or the incremental
borrowing rate can be used as alternative starting points for determining an appropriate
discount rate.
The aim of this paper is to show and to analyze the functional interrelation between
the WACC, the cost of borrowing and the incremental borrowing rate and to discuss the
implications of these interrelations for IAS 36’s value in use.
1. We will show that the two ,,starting points“ mentioned above in fact represent
completely diﬀerent concepts. The functional interrelation between them is very
complex even under the simplest assumptions.
1See IAS 36.6.
2See for example Brealey and Myers (2003), chapter 19 for a discussion of the various DCF-models.
3See IAS 36.56 read in conjunction with appendix A15 and A16. However, costs of capital readily
observable in the capital market will exist only rarely, as the former International Accounting Standards
Committee (IASC) acknowledges, see IAS 36.BCZ 55.
1According to ﬁnance theory, the WACC is the only appropriate mean for deter-
mining a value in use. Consequently, alternatives (2) and (3) in IAS 36.55 should
be discarded. Even if the theoretical diﬀerences between the WACC and the in-
cremental borrowing rate are left aside, the errors in estimating the cost of capital
can be substantial for highly leveraged reporting entities. We will show that if the
incremental borrowing rate is used by a highly leveraged entity, the determination
of the value in use will be erroneous: The value in use will be systematically too
low.
2. In addition, we will demonstrate that the interpretation of the term ,,incremental
borrowing rate“ gives rise to the possibility of earnings management: The incremen-
tal borrowing rate for capital will diﬀer signiﬁcantly if lending is risky, depending
on whether the claims will be satisﬁed
• after any other claims (subordinated debt, junior debt) or
• together with other claims (pari passu, senior debt)
on liquidation.
2 Assumptions and Notation
Our analysis of the functional interrelations between the WACC, the cost of borrowing
and the incremental borrowing rate is based on the following assumptions:
1. Markets are frictionless, i.e. there are no transaction costs, bankruptcy costs, taxes,
or restrictions on short selling. Information is costless and simultaneously available
to all investors.
2. Operating cash ﬂows are independent of the choice of capital structure; there are
no business disruption costs.
3. Investors maximize their end-of-period wealth. They have homogeneous expecta-
tions about asset returns; the instantaneous rate of return on any asset and the
market portfolio have a normal distribution. Investors may borrow or lend unlim-
ited amounts at the risk-free rate.
The following notation is used in this paper:




BV Book value of the entity’s debt
D Market value of the entity’s debt
Eu Market value of the unleveraged entity’s equity
El Market value of the leveraged entity’s equity
V u Market value of the unleveraged entity
V l Market value of the leveraged entity
kD Borrowing cost
kl
E Cost of equity of the leveraged entity
ku
E Cost of equity of the unleveraged entity
rf Risk-free interest rate
i Nominal borrowing rate for the entity’s debt
in Nominal borrowing rate for subordinated debt
WACC Weighted cost of capital
σ Volatility of normally distributed yields
µ Expectation of normally distributed yields
N(.) Standard normal distribution
3 The Modigliani-Miller-Model
Modigliani and Miller (1958) showed that a ﬁrm’s market value is independent from its
capital structure (its leverage):4 The market value of an leveraged entity V l equals the




Stiglitz (1969) und Rubinstein (1973) showed that the capital structure is irrelevant even
if debt is risky. This generalization of the Modigliani-Miller-Model (1) may be proved by
means of some simple lines of thought based on arbitrage: On a perfect market the
leveraged entity’s market value V l equals the sum of the market value of the leveraged
entity’s equity El and the market value of the entity’s debt D,
V
l = E
l + D. (2)
4The proof essentially bases on assumptions 1 und 2, see chapter 2.
3The claims of the equity holders of an unleveraged entity would equal the combined equity
holders’ claims and debt holders’ claims if the entity was leveraged:
Payoﬀs at Maturity Current Value
Shareholder’s position max(g CF − Z − T,0) El
Bondholder’s position min(Z + T,g CF) D
Sum of the positions g CF V l
Consequently, the Modigliani-Miller-Model (1) holds true also for risky debt. This
model is of the utmost importance for the explanation of diﬀerent costs of capital. In
general, the cost of capital of any entity may be deﬁned as the expected yields of the
respective groups of claimants,
k
l
E = E [max(g CF − Z − T,0)]/E
l − 1, (3)
kD = E [min(Z + T,g CF)]/D − 1, (4)
WACC = E [g CF]/V
l − 1. (5)





l + kD D/V
l . (6)




E = E [g CF]/V
u − 1, (7)
then, following directly from the Modigliani-Miller-Model (1) and the deﬁnition of the
costs of capital (5) it can be shown that WACC is independent of the debt-equity-ratio




Furthermore, it can be shown, deriving from (6) and (8), that the cost of equity is a









If lending/borrowing is not risky, this is a linear function of the entity’s debt-equity-ratio.
Figure 1 illustrates the implications of the Modigliani-Miller-Model (1) for the relation
between the entity’s cost of capital: The WACC equal the cost of equity of the unleveraged
entity, independent of the debt-equity-ratio. For low debt-equity-ratios the cost of equity
increases linearly with the entity’s debt-equity-ratio. If the debt-equity-ratio reaches the
level where the debt becomes risky, the borrowing costs will rise and the slope of the cost
of equity will decrease.5
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Figure 1: Cost of Capital of a Leveraged Entity
In chapter 4, our ﬁrst step is to explain the interrelation between the market value of
debt and equity based on the option pricing theory. Afterwards, in chapter 5, we analyze
the interrelation between the cost of capital and the nominal borrowing rate when debt
is risky. Finally, in chapter (6), we will determine the incremental borrowing rate.
4 Equity as a Call Option and the Value of Debt
In order to explain the relation between the market value of the entity’s equity and its
debt, assuming given and ﬁxed investing activities, we will go back to the Modigliani-
Miller-Model (1) in connection with the no-arbitrage-restriction (2),
V
u = E
l + D. (10)
As shown above, this equation is valid also if debt is risky, however, it does not explain the
relation between the market value of the entity’s equity and the market value of its debt.
It does also not explain if this relation is a function of the entity’s debt-equity-ratio. If
so, it does not explain what kind of function it is. The relation of the equity’s and debt’s
market values may be explained either by the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) or
the option pricing theory. Both are consistent with one another.6 We will use the option
pricing theory, because it allows us a preference-free determination of the values.
Black and Scholes (1973) were the ﬁrst to show that the equity of a limited liability
company may be viewed as a call option: The owners of the company will only claim the
company’s cash ﬂows if the cash ﬂows exceed the amortization and interest to be paid. If
not, they will forfeit the option and ask for liquidation of the company in accordance with
the local insolvency proceedings. Consequently, the cash ﬂows to the equity holders of a
6Hsia (1981) proved the consistency of the Modigliani-Miller-Model, the option pricing theory and
the CAPM.
5leveraged entity are the same as the cash ﬂows resulting from a call on an unleveraged,
but apart from that, similar entity. The call’s strike price equals the sum of interest and
amortization to be paid by the leveraged entity.
In a similar way, Merton (1974) showed that the claims of the creditors may be
regarded as the interest plus amortization less the pay-oﬀ of a put (see ﬁgure 2). Therefore,
the market value of the risky debt will decrease by the market value of a put, which could
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Figure 2: Shareholders’ and Bondholders’ Payoﬀ at Maturity
Based on that, the relation of the market values of equity and risky debt may be
explained using option pricing theory. Using the Modigliani-Miller-equation (10) it can
be shown that
V
u = Value of Call(Z + T)
| {z }
=El




which is basically the common put-call-parity. Starting from the market value of an
unleveraged entity, we are now able to explain the relation between the market values
of equity and debt and an increasing debt-equity-ratio e.g. with the model of Black and
Scholes (1973).
Exhibit 1 Assume the market value of the unleveraged entity V u with an entity’s life
of one year is 100CU, the volatility of the normally distributed yields is σ = 20% p.a.
and the risk-free interest rate is rf = 5% p.a. If the equity holders decide to substitute
part of their equity with debt, the market value of the leveraged entity V l will not change,
according to the Modigliani-Miller-Model (1). Assuming contractually ﬁxed amortization
and interest is e.g. 80CU, it follows, according to Black and Scholes (1973) and the
put-call-parity (11), that the market value of the equity will be 24.51CU, the market value
of the debt will be 75.49CU.
65 The Cost of Debt and the Promised Yield on Debt
The market value of the entity’s debt equals, according to (4), the present value of the
creditors, that is, the creditor’s expected cash ﬂows, discounted with the cost of debt kD
(borrowing cost). The creditors calculate the nominal borrowing rate i according to the
market value of their debt. The amortization and interest (Z + T) which has to be
contractually paid by the entity, discounted with the nominal borrowing rate, will also
equal the market value of the debt on an capital market, assuming it is free of arbitrage,
D = E [min(Z + T,g CF)] / (1 + kD) = (Z + T) / (1 + i). (12)
Thus, when the debt is not risky, the cost of debt kD equals the contractual nominal
borrowing rate i . However, if debt is risky, the cost of debt will always be smaller than
the nominal borrowing rate (kD < i). Based on the equations for the market values of
debt and equity we derived in chapter 4, we are now able to determine the cost of capital
(3), (4) and (5) and the respective nominal borrowing rates, provided the expected cash
ﬂows of both creditors and equity holders are known. It seems that this relation has been
somewhat unnoticed so in the literature so far. 7
Exhibit 2 All data is the same as in exhibit 1. In addition, let the expected yield of the
cash ﬂows of the unleveraged entity be µ = 7.5% p.a. Following from this, the expected
cash ﬂows, assuming normally distributed yields, will be
E [g CF] = V
u e
µ+σ2/2 = 109.97. (13)
The WACC (4) will then be WACC = 9.97% and they are independent of the debt-equity-
ratio of the entity. The expected cash ﬂows to the equity holders will be 8













and the expected cash ﬂows of the creditors may be determined as being
E [min(Z + T,g CF)] = E [g CF] − E [max(g CF − Z − T,0)] = 79.56. (15)
Using the market values for equity and debt determined in exhibit (1) and based on
deﬁnitions (3) and (4) we may calculate the cost of equity as kl
E =24.09% and the cost of
debt as kD =5.38%. According to (12) these costs of debt (borrowing costs) are equivalent
to a nominal borrowing rate of i =5.97%.
7The only exception known to the authors is the work of Cooper and Davydenko (2001).
8See, e.g. Cox and Rubinstein (1985) p. 323 f.
76 An Entity’s Incremental Borrowing Rate
According to IAS 36.A17, the incremental borrowing rate may be used as a starting point
to determine the cost of capital. The wording ,,Incremental [sic!] Borrowing Rate“ would
be redundant if it was not understood as the cost of additional, risky debt. However,
if debt is risky, there is a distinction between the nominal borrowing rate and the cost
of debt, see equation (12). Unfortunately, appendix A.17 does not clearly state whether
a nominal borrowing rate or the incremental cost of debt is meant in this context. In
addition, the standard is open to interpretation as to whether this incremental borrowing
rate is related to subordinated debt (junior debt) or senior debt (pari passu). However,
this question is of vital importance: Incremental (additional) risky debt would require
the contracts concerning the old debt to be re-assessed and re-negotiated: The nominal
borrowing rate would have to be adjusted according to the new (higher) risk. However,
in praxi, this would not normally be the case. It is only possible to satisfactorly interpret
appendix A.17 (and thus, IAS 36) when the interrelations between the WACC, the cost of
debt and the nominal borrowing rate for subordinated debt are taken into consideration.
To determine the incremental nominal borrowing rate and the incremental cost of debt,
we assume that amortization and interest (Z + T) will increase by one currency unit if
the entity chooses to raise additional debt from another creditor. The claims of the equity
holders will decrease by one currency unit accordingly (assuming ﬁxed investing activities).
With the method derived in chapters 4 and 5, we are now able to determine the market
value of the debt and the related cost of debt as well as the incremental borrowing rate
according to this higher debt-equity-ratio. We may determine the nominal borrowing
rate for the additional debt by calculating the market value of the debt and the sum of
the expected cash ﬂows without the additional debt. The cost of debt for the additional
subordinated debt and the related nominal borrowing rates may then easily be determined
based on the diﬀerences of the two calculations.
Exhibit 3 Based on the data of exhibit 1 und 2 assume that the contractual amortization
increases by one currency unit. After this increase and based on the option pricing equa-
tions of chapter 4 the market value of the equity is 23.66CU and the market value of the
debt is 76.34CU. The expected cash ﬂows are 80.48CU, determined as in exhibit 2. The
cost of debt for all of the debt is 5.43%, the respective nominal borrowing rate is 6.10%.
If the additional debt is subordinated debt, the situation is diﬀerent: Assuming that the
nominal borrowing rate of the old debt stays the same (as in exhibit 2) the cost of the
additional debt may be determined as
(80.48378 − 79.55601)/(76.34171 − 75.49376) − 1 = 9.41%, (16)
therefore, requiring a contractual agreement on a nominal borrowing rate of in = 17.93%.
8Figure 3 clearly shows, based on the data of exhibits 1-3, that the nominal borrowing
rate is substantially diﬀerent from the cost of debt kD at a debt-equity-ratio of D/El =
75.49/24.51 ≈ 3, even if there is only one homogeneous group of creditors. Under these
conditions, the nominal borrowing rate would only be an acceptable approximation for
the WACC at a debt-equity-ratio as high as D/El ≈ 7. Therefore, the nominal borrowing
rate for additional subordinated debt does not seem to be an acceptable approximation for
WACC. Even at a debt-equity-ratio as low as D/El ≈ 3, the nominal interest borrowing
rate for additional debt would be in ≈ 18%, see exhibit 3. The diﬀerence between the
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Figure 3: Cost of Capital and Nominal Interest Rate
7 Summary and Conclusions
Determining a value in use in accordance with IAS 36 requires estimating the cost of
capital. The guidance in IAS 36.A17 recommends using the weighted cost of capital
(WACC), estimated e.g. based on the CAPM. This recommendation is in accordance with
the ,,state of the art“ of ﬁnance theory. Alternatively, appendix A.17 allows estimating
the cost of capital based on the ,,incremental borrowing rate“. This wording is open
to interpretation as to whether a nominal borrowing rate for senior or junior debt is
meant, i.e. whether additional debt is subordinated or is equally ranked with the old
debt. Depending on the debt-equity-ratio, the cost of debt, the nominal borrowing rate
and the WACC may diﬀer substantially. The interrelation between these three ﬁgures
is complex, even under the simplest assumptions. This is particularly true if additional
debt is subordinated. Without the information to determine WACC, it is impossible to
calculate WACC based on either the cost of debt or the nominal borrowing rate. If the
9information is known, it would be simpler to directly determine WACC in the ﬁrst place.
IAS 36’s recommendation to estimate the cost of capital (as the discount rate to determine
the value in use) based on the ,,Incremental Borrowing Rate“ is therefore redundant and,
moreover, potentially misleading. To avoid substantial estimation errors resulting from
IAS 36’s guidance, it should be noted that the value in use may only be determined based
on WACC and by no means on the ,,Incremental Borrowing Rate“. From the point of
view of the reporting entity, the guidance in IAS 36.A17 allows earnings management: If
a highly leveraged entity is interested in a high impairment, it may determine the value
in use using an estimated cost of capital based on the ,,Incremental Borrowing Rate“. If
the entity is not highly leveraged, it may use WACC as the discount rate instead. If the
reporting entity is interested in a low impairment, it may act vice versa, i.e. use WACC
if the entity is highly leveraged, and the incremental borrowing rate if it is not.9
9IAS 8.13 requires the entity to apply its accounting policies consistently. However, this requirement
only applies to similar transactions: The entity is not allowed to change the method of determination of
the discount rate for similar assets every year, but it may use diﬀerent methods for diﬀerent assets in one
reporting period, because it does not consider the assets as being similar.
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